feat: implement LI.FI intents API integration and enhance composer route handling

- Added intentsApi.ts for handling intents-related API calls.
- Introduced useIntentOrderStatus.ts for managing intent order status with React Query.
- Created withdrawComposerRoute.ts to manage the withdrawal process through composer routes.
- Enhanced error handling and user feedback during the withdrawal process.
- Updated earnApi.ts to separate quote URL building from fetching logic.
- Improved type definitions in types.ts and added nullable symbol handling for EarnToken.
- Implemented nonce generation for unique order identification in nonce.ts.
- Added deadline management for orders in deadlines.ts.
- Created standardOrder.ts for building and managing standard order structures.
- Updated Vercel and Vite configurations to support new API endpoints.

Author: Timidan

.codegraph/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# CodeGraph data files
+# These are local to each machine and should not be committed
+
+# Database
+*.db
+*.db-wal
+*.db-shm
+
+# Cache
+cache/
+
+# Logs
+*.log
+
+# Hook markers
+.dirty

api/lifi-intents.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+import type { VercelRequest, VercelResponse } from "@vercel/node";
+import * as crypto from "crypto";
+
+export const config = {
+  api: { bodyParser: false },
+  maxDuration: 30,
+};
+
+const ORDER_BASE = "https://order.li.fi";
+
+// Allowlist keeps solver-only endpoints out of the browser surface; they'd
+// 401 upstream, but a clean 404 here is friendlier and saves a round trip.
+const ALLOWED_PATHS = new Set([
+  "quote/request",
+  "orders/submit",
+  "orders/status",
+  "orders",
+  "routes",
+  "chains/supported",
+]);
+
+const ALLOWED_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "POST", "OPTIONS", "HEAD"]);
+const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = new Set(
+  (process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS || "").split(",").filter(Boolean),
+);
+const PROXY_SECRET = process.env.PROXY_SECRET || "";
+
+// Real /quote/request payloads are ~1-2 KiB; cap at 16 KiB to bound serverless
+// CPU on abuse traffic.
+const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 16 * 1024;
+
+// Best-effort per-IP rate limit (resets on cold start). Friction, not auth.
+const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
+const RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 120;
+const rateBuckets = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
+
+function rateLimit(req: VercelRequest): boolean {
+  const fwd = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"];
+  const ip = (Array.isArray(fwd) ? fwd[0] : fwd ?? req.socket?.remoteAddress ?? "")
+    .toString()
+    .split(",")[0]
+    .trim();
+  if (!ip) return true; // can't identify caller — let it through, upstream will protect
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const slot = rateBuckets.get(ip);
+  if (!slot || slot.resetAt < now) {
+    rateBuckets.set(ip, { count: 1, resetAt: now + RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS });
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (slot.count >= RATE_LIMIT_MAX) return false;
+  slot.count += 1;
+  return true;
+}
+
+function getAllowedOrigin(req: VercelRequest): string | null {
+  const origin = req.headers.origin;
+  if (!origin) return null;
+  if (ALLOWED_ORIGINS.has(origin)) return origin;
+  if (origin.startsWith("http://localhost:")) return origin;
+  const host = req.headers.host;
+  if (host && origin === `https://${host}`) return origin;
+  return null;
+}
+
+function hasValidSecret(req: VercelRequest): boolean {
+  if (!PROXY_SECRET) return false;
+  const header = req.headers["x-proxy-secret"];
+  if (typeof header !== "string") return false;
+  const a = Buffer.from(header);
+  const b = Buffer.from(PROXY_SECRET);
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b);
+}
+
+class BodyTooLargeError extends Error {
+  constructor() {
+    super("body_too_large");
+  }
+}
+
+async function readBody(req: VercelRequest, cap: number): Promise<string> {
+  const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
+  let total = 0;
+  for await (const chunk of req) {
+    const buf = Buffer.from(chunk);
+    total += buf.length;
+    if (total > cap) throw new BodyTooLargeError();
+    chunks.push(buf);
+  }
+  return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8");
+}
+
+export default async function handler(
+  req: VercelRequest,
+  res: VercelResponse,
+) {
+  const allowedOrigin = getAllowedOrigin(req);
+
+  if (req.method === "OPTIONS") {
+    if (allowedOrigin) {
+      res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowedOrigin);
+    }
+    res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS");
+    res.setHeader(
+      "Access-Control-Allow-Headers",
+      "Content-Type, x-proxy-secret",
+    );
+    return res.status(204).end();
+  }
+
+  if (PROXY_SECRET) {
+    if (!hasValidSecret(req)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: "Forbidden" });
+    }
+  } else {
+    // Without PROXY_SECRET we require a known Origin — rejecting missing-Origin
+    // requests (curl, server-to-server) keeps the public endpoint scrape-resistant.
+    if (!allowedOrigin || !req.headers.origin) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: "Origin required" });
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!ALLOWED_METHODS.has(req.method || "")) {
+    return res.status(405).json({ error: "Method not allowed" });
+  }
+
+  if (!rateLimit(req)) {
+    return res.status(429).json({ error: "rate_limited" });
+  }
+
+  const pathParam = req.query?.path;
+  const subPath = (
+    Array.isArray(pathParam)
+      ? pathParam.join("/")
+      : typeof pathParam === "string"
+        ? pathParam
+        : ""
+  ).replace(/^\/+/, "");
+
+  if (!ALLOWED_PATHS.has(subPath)) {
+    return res.status(404).json({ error: "unsupported_intents_path" });
+  }
+
+  const params = new URLSearchParams();
+  for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(req.query || {})) {
+    if (key === "path") continue;
+    if (Array.isArray(val)) {
+      val.forEach((v) => params.append(key, v));
+    } else if (typeof val === "string") {
+      params.append(key, val);
+    }
+  }
+  const qs = params.toString();
+
+  const upstream = `${ORDER_BASE}/${subPath}${qs ? `?${qs}` : ""}`;
+  const method = (req.method || "GET").toUpperCase();
+  let body: string | undefined;
+  if (method === "POST") {
+    try {
+      body = await readBody(req, MAX_BODY_BYTES);
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof BodyTooLargeError) {
+        return res.status(413).json({ error: "body_too_large", maxBytes: MAX_BODY_BYTES });
+      }
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const upstreamRes = await fetch(upstream, {
+      method,
+      headers: {
+        Accept: "application/json",
+        ...(body ? { "Content-Type": "application/json" } : {}),
+      },
+      body,
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(25_000),
+    });
+
+    const text = await upstreamRes.text();
+
+    if (allowedOrigin) {
+      res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", allowedOrigin);
+    }
+    res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
+    return res.status(upstreamRes.status).send(text);
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error("[lifi-intents] upstream error:", err);
+    return res.status(502).json({ error: "Upstream request failed" });
+  }
+}

edb

@@ -1 +1 @@
-Subproject commit 1ba2fcaca73cee96bf10107b7b0f98ab1ceab1a4
+Subproject commit c5b32ca53e7c2146e647830af486b6481aa37548